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Abstract 
We study the perception of risks in the funding of microfinance institutions. A survey addressed to microfinance 
institutions and their funding organizations reveals that several risk types, among them foreign exchange (FX) 
risk, are not considered to be as important as reported in the relevant literature. We obtain further insights into 
the FX risk management of microfinance actors and reveal that many FX risk mitigation strategies and hedging 
tools are rarely used in practice. 
Keywords: sustainable finance, microfinance, FX risk, risk management, survey 
1. Introduction 
The microfinance sector was subject to rapid growth in the years 2006 to 2010. This development was mainly 
enabled by the sector’s ongoing interaction with international capital markets, which made microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) more and more independent from donations. Many MFIs were transformed from subsidized 
organizations into more professional and profit-orientated financial institutions. According to Ledgerwood and 
White (2006), the refinancing possibilities on international capital markets, allowing MFIs to enlarge their 
lending capacity, are “widely viewed as the best way to achieve the outreach needed to substantially increase 
access to financial services for the world’s hundreds of millions of low-income households”. This development 
has been boosted by the establishment of several international microfinance investment funds (MFIFs) and other, 
often structured, investment vehicles specialized in funding MFIs (see Dorfleitner, Leidl & Priberny, 2011, for an 
overview). The investment in MFIs in direct or indirect form via MFIFs provides benefits for sustainable 
investors. Microfinance investments are regarded to provide reasonably good diversification effects if combined 
with stocks and bonds (Krauss & Walter, 2009). Furthermore, investors can participate from a social return 
(Tulchin, 2003), which comes additionally to their financial revenue. The relevance of such a social component 
is confirmed by the incorporation of a social dimension into portfolio theory (e.g. Dorfleitner, Leidl & Reeder, 
2012; Barracchini & Addessi, 2012).  
According to El-Zoghbi, Gähwiler and Lauer (2011), funders reported a total amount of USD 21.3 billion of 
cross-border debt and equity invested in MFIs in December 2009. This implies an increase of 17% in 2009 
despite the global financial crisis. However, refinancing with international debt titles instead of donations makes 
MFIs more vulnerable to various risk types that are already well known in commercial banking. Granting 
microloans to borrowers does not only result in credit risk, but also in liquidity risk due to the refinancing 
process, interest rate risk and foreign exchange (FX) risk and furthermore to operational risks such as staff fraud 
(Churchill & Frankiewicz, 2006). 
In particular the issue of FX risk is regarded as a challenge for the microfinance industry, which has to be dealt 
with in order to achieve a stable and sustainable long-term MFI funding. MFIs and MFIFs that provide MFIs 
with loans in local currency are particularly supposed to naturally have a large FX risk exposure. According to 
Barrès (2007), FX risk occurs due to the mismatch of currencies in which assets and liabilities are denominated, 
combined with uncertainty about future FX fluctuations. Many MFIs operating in emerging markets face a 
mismatch between the currency of liabilities and assets, which concerns mainly loans granted to microborrowers. 
The financial markets in developing countries are, in many cases, not mature enough to provide sufficient funds 
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for MFIs in local currencies. Swanson (2007) highlights several reasons for this phenomenon: The bond markets 
in most developing countries are poorly regulated and thin, local commercial banks often lack deeper knowledge 
on how to analyze the risk associated with microfinance and therefore shrink away from investing in MFIs and 
there may also be investment restrictions that exclude microfinance. Holden and Holden (2004) state that 
therefore the majority of MFIs is forced to refinance themselves, at least partially, by borrowing in hard 
currencies, mainly USD and EUR, while offering loans to clients in the local currency. 
Featherston, Littlefield and Mwangi (2006) quote that many developing countries face reasonably high FX 
fluctuations, which is backed by the studies on exchange rates from Cavazos (2004) and Abrams (2008). 
Existing literature has so far clarified in which way the microfinance industry is affected by FX risk (Featherston 
et al., 2006; Abrams & Schneider-Moretto, 2008) and which tools can be used to mitigate the FX risk exposure. 
Generally, these are swaps, cross currency swaps, futures, options, back-to-back loans, foreign currency deposits, 
countervailing deposits and currency devaluation accounts. Such instruments have already been discussed and 
explained in detail by Holden and Holden (2004), Cavazos (2004), Bhatia (2004) and Featherston et al. (2006). 
However, for many currencies the instruments mentioned above are not available. For such cases a currency 
exchange fund such as the Dutch ‘TCX fund’ (see www.tcxfund.com) could be considered as an appropriate 
alternative. TCX holds long-term emerging market currency and interest rate derivatives amounting to a total 
volume of about USD 700 million in 2011 and manages its total FX risk through diversification. MFIs can also 
account for their FX exposure through mitigation techniques, such as limiting the funds received in foreign 
currencies or an indexation of microloans to a hard currency. 
Relatively little insight exists about how microfinance actors assess different risk types, in particular FX risk, 
and FX risk management tools. To our best knowledge, Barrès (2007) is currently the only author who has 
published survey results on FX risk management of MFIFs. By conducting a survey on risk types and FX 
management strategies in the MFI funding process addressed to a comprehensive group of microfinance actors 
we try to fill the existing gap. In Section 2 we present the survey methodology, design and samples. In Section 3 
we discuss the results on selected issues with respect to the existing literature. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Survey and Methodology 
From July 8th, 2010, to August 11th, 2010, we conducted a web-based survey asking approximately 900 
organizations involved in microfinance how they assess several risk types, in particular FX risk, and risk 
management tools. The addressees of the survey were affiliated to MFIs and MFI funders, which we summarize 
as MFIFs. Furthermore, we accepted answers by experts consulting such organizations. We used a standardized 
online questionnaire to facilitate anonymity. A sum of 198 persons participated but some of them did not 
complete the questionnaire and were therefore excluded from the sample. This results in 164 observations, which 
correspond to a response rate of approximately 18%. The survey design differentiates between MFIs and MFIFs, 
as we suspect differences regarding the risk perception of both groups. This discrimination allowed us to 
marginally adjust the questionnaire for MFIs or MFIFs. As a consequence we additionally asked MFIs about 
their total loan portfolio size, number of employees, average loan size and country of operation. The key figures 
characterizing the MFI sample are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Key figures of the MFIs that participated in the survey shown as frequency tables 
Panel A DEV Africa LAC SEE ME CA SEAP Other 
c.s. 3 (3.53) 10 (11.76) 27 (31.76) 16 (18.82) 4 (4.71) 10 (11.76) 9 (10.59) 
e.FX 1 (2.17) 6 (13.04) 16 (34.78) 6 (13.04) 3 (6.52) 4 (8.70) 4 (8.70) 
Panel B < 0.5 0.50 – 2.50 2.51 – 5.00 5.01 – 7.50 7.51 – 10.00 10.01 – 50.00 > 50 
c.s. 2 (2.35) 12 (14.12) 8 (9.41) 8 (9.41) 3 (3.53) 39 (45.88) 13 (15.29) 
e.FX 1 (2.13) 5 (10.64) 4 (8.51) 6 (12.77) 1 (2.13) 22 (46.81) 8 (17.02) 
Panel C 1 – 10 11 – 50 51 – 100 101 – 500 > 500 
c.s. 2 (2.41) 11 (13.25) 20 (24.10) 31 (37.35) 19 (22.89) 
e.FX 1 (2.13) 7 (14.89) 11 (23.40) 17 (36.17) 11 (23.40) 
Panel D < 100 100 – 500 501 – 1 000 1 001 – 1 500 1 501 – 2000 2 001 – 2500 > 2 500 
c.s. 3 (3.75) 20 (25.00) 16 (20.00) 18 (22.50) 7 (8.75) 3 (3.75) 13 (16.25) 
e.FX 2 (4.26) 10 (21.28) 10 (21.28) 13 (27.66) 4 (8.51) 3 (6.38) 5 (10.64) 
Description: ‘c.s.’ refers to the complete sample and ‘e.FX’ shows the results for a subsample consisting out of MFIs that are exposed to FX 
risk. Relative percentage values appear in parentheses. Panel A: Region, in which the MFI mainly operates. We distinguish between 
developed economies (DEV), Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Southern/Eastern Europe (SEE), Middle East (ME), Central 
Asia (CA), Southeast Asia and the Pacific (SEAP) and other. Panel B: Categorized size of MFI’s total loan portfolio in mio. USD. Panel C: 
Categorized number of MFI’s employees. Panel D: Average loan size of microloans in USD. 
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The additional information allowed us to form suitable subsamples for a deeper investigation. First, small MFIs 
are suspected of lacking deeper knowledge on risk management. Therefore one might expect differences 
regarding the perception of risks and the risk management between small and large, established MFIs. To 
analyze this point we split the complete MFI sample, consisting of 95 answers, into two subsamples. Subsample 
‘large’ consists of 52 MFIs with a total loan portfolio size larger than 10 mio. USD and a subsample ‘small’ with 
less than (or equal) 10 mio. USD including 32 observations. For eleven MFIs the loan portfolio size was not 
determinable. Second, a detailed analysis of the entire MFI sample reveals that some MFIs are not exposed to 
FX risk. As these might distort our results we create a subsample ‘e.FX’ of those 47 MFIs that are exposed to FX 
risk because a certain portion of their liabilities is denominated in a foreign currency and the local currency is not 
tied to the foreign currency. A corresponding subsample was created analogously for the MFIF sample, but in 
this case related to assets in local currency, which is a foreign currency from the MFIF’s viewpoint. 
It could be suspected that predominantly smaller, non-developed MFIs participated in the survey, which might 
distort the results due to selection bias. We clarify this issue by comparing the total loan portfolio size of the 
participating MFIs with comprehensive data on this measure obtained from an online platform operated by the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (see www.mixmarket.org) that comprises 1310 MFIs. Based on data from 
2009, we test for differences regarding the distributions of the datasets by applying the one-sided Mann-Whitney 
U test (Mann & Whitney, 1947). Our results show that our sample consists mainly of larger MFIs, in which 
financial risk management tools are assumed to be more common than in the under-represented smaller ones.  
The results are presented in form of frequency tables in Section 3. The different levels of categorized data follow 
a numeric rating scale. In addition to the purely descriptive view, we apply the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test 
for significance. Regarding the responding experts as a representative sample, the test allows us to draw 
conclusions about the entire microfinance investment scene. Whereas most questions concerned how often 
instruments are used or how significant the participants consider different risks, we test with one-sided tests 
applied to both directions (e.g. neutral value versus rare and neutral value versus often) with a significance level 
of 10%. Furthermore, we test for differences between the subsamples regarding several questions by using the 
Mann-Whitney U test. Again, we test in both directions with a confidence level of 10%.  
3. Selected Issues and Discussion  
3.1 Which Risk Types Are Considered as Being Significant by Microfinance Actors? 
The results of the survey regarding this question are shown in Table 2 for MFIs and in Table 3 for MFIFs. Our 
findings concerning the complete MFI sample indicate that MFIs do not consider fluctuations of donations to be 
crucial for their refinancing. Likewise, they rate risks concerning political stability and surprisingly FX risk as 
rather unimportant. Especially the last finding appears in deep contrast to the prevailing opinion that 
microfinance actors are expected to have a large FX risk exposure. However, the results might be distorted by 
some MFIs that are indeed not exposed to FX risk. With regard to FX risk, the data of the subsample ‘e.FX’ 
show a clear shift of the distribution towards importance, even if this cannot be proven by the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. The same situation is observable for large MFIs. The only risk type regarded as being significant by 
MFIs is the one implied by macroeconomic factors, e.g. unemployment, inflation. Furthermore, we test for 
differences regarding the judgment of small MFIs and large MFIs considering the different risk types by using 
the Mann-Whitney U test. However, the tests do not reveal any significant differences in the risk assessment. 
The results regarding the MFIF sample, shown in Table 3, contrast to those of the MFIs. Even though MFIs and 
MFIFs come to the same opinion regarding the dependency on donations and macroeconomic factors, MFIFs 
also consider credit risk and political stability to be significantly important. As is the case with MFI, for FX risk 
we observe a shift of the distribution towards importance in the subsample ‘e.FX’. However, the Mann-Whitney 
U tests regarding differences in the risk assessment between MFIs and MFIFs indicate that MFIs only consider 
liquidity risk to be more severe than MFIFs do. 
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Table 2. Risk assessment of MFIs 
    1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
Dependency on donations c.s. 30 (50.00) 8 (13.33) 13 (21.67) 3 (5.00) 6 (10.00) insign. (<0.0001)
e.FX 18 (50.00) 7 (19.44) 8 (22.22) 1 (2.78) 2 (5.56) insign. (<0.0001)
large 19 (55.88) 3 (8.82) 7 (20.59) 5 (14.71) insign. (0.0016) 
  small 11 (42.31) 5 (19.23) 6 (23.08) 3 (11.54) 1 (3.85) insign. (0.0018) 
Operational risks c.s. 6 (8.33) 16 (22.22) 28 (38.89) 10 (13.89) 12 (16.67) 
e.FX 3 (6.82) 8 (18.18) 20 (45.45) 6 (13.64) 7 (15.91) 
large 3 (6.82) 9 (20.45) 19 (43.18) 7 (15.91) 6 (13.64) 
  small 3 (10.71) 7 (25.00) 9 (32.14) 3 (10.71) 6 (21.43) 
Counterparty risk c.s. 9 (13.04) 13 (18.84) 26 (37.68) 6 (8.70) 15 (21.74) 
e.FX 4 (9.30) 8 (18.6) 18 (41.86) 2 (4.65) 11 (25.58) 
large 7 (16.28) 6 (13.95) 15 (34.88) 6 (13.95) 9 (20.93) 
  small 2 (7.69) 7 (26.92) 11 (42.31) 6 (23.08) 
Liquidity risk c.s. 9 (13.04) 13 (18.84) 26 (37.68) 6 (8.70) 15 (21.74) 
e.FX 4 (9.09) 11 (25.00) 14 (31.82) 6 (13.64) 9 (20.45) 
large 6 (13.95) 7 (16.28) 14 (32.56) 6 (13.95) 10 (23.26) 
  small 1 (3.57) 8 (28.57) 11 (39.29) 3 (10.71) 5 (17.86) 
FX risk c.s. 12 (19.67) 16 (26.23) 16 (26.23) 9 (14.75) 8 (13.11) insign. (0.0881) 
e.FX 3 (7.14) 10 (23.81) 15 (35.71) 9 (21.43) 5 (11.90) 
large 7 (17.95) 9 (23.08) 11 (28.21) 6 (15.38) 6 (15.38) 
  small 5 (22.73) 7 (31.82) 5 (22.73) 3 (13.64) 2 (9.09) insign. (0.0618) 
Interest rate risk c.s. 7 (10.14) 18 (26.09) 22 (31.88) 16 (23.19) 6 (8.70) 
e.FX 4 (9.52) 13 (30.95) 12 (28.57) 9 (21.43) 4 (9.52) 
large 5 (11.63) 11 (25.58) 14 (32.56) 11 (25.58) 2 (4.65) 
  small 2 (7.69) 7 (26.92) 8 (30.77) 5 (19.23) 4 (15.38) 
Political instability c.s. 15 (22.06) 17 (25.00) 21 (30.88) 8 (11.76) 7 (10.29) insign. (0.0129) 
e.FX 9 (20.93) 9 (20.93) 13 (30.23) 5 (11.63) 7 (16.28) 
large 9 (20.93) 9 (20.93) 13 (30.23) 7 (16.28) 5 (11.63) 
  small 6 (24.00) 8 (32.00) 8 (32.00) 1 (4.00) 2 (8.00) insign. (0.0160) 
Macroeconomic factors c.s. 4 (5.63) 14 (19.72) 22 (30.99) 20 (28.17) 11 (15.49) sign. (0.0191) 
e.FX 2 (4.55) 8 (18.18) 15 (34.09) 9 (20.45) 10 (22.73) sign. (0.0142) 
large 3 (6.82) 10 (22.73) 13 (29.55) 12 (27.27) 6 (13.64) 
  small 1 (3.70) 4 (14.81) 9 (33.33) 8 (29.63) 5 (18.52) sign. (0.0244) 
Climatic risk factors c.s. 11 (15.28) 20 (27.78) 15 (20.83) 13 (18.06) 13 (18.06) 
e.FX 7 (15.91) 13 (29.55) 7 (15.91) 7 (15.91) 10 (22.73) 
large 4 (9.09) 16 (36.36) 10 (22.73) 9 (20.45) 5 (11.36) 
  small 7 (25.00) 4 (14.29) 5 (17.86) 4 (14.29) 8 (28.57) 
Description: Survey question: “How would you rate the following potential types of risk for your organization?” Frequency tables with 
relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 (category 5) means that the risk type is regarded as insignificant (very significant). The 
last column shows the results of one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with the neutral category 3 as null hypothesis, whenever the test 
rejects at a significance level of 10% (p-value in parentheses). No entry corresponds to a non-significant test result. ‘sign.’ or ‘insign.’ means 
that the risk types are regarded as rather ‘significant’ or ‘insignificant’. For a description of ‘c.s.’ and ‘e.FX’ see Table 1. ‘large’ and ‘small’ 
symbolize the subsamples of smaller and larger MFIs with respect to portfolio size. ‘Counterparty risk’ refers to the credit risk arising from 
lending to micro-entrepreneurs, ‘Macroeconomic factors’ means e.g. inflation, unemployment. ‘Climatic risk factors’ are e.g. drought, 
flooding. The size of the entire sample is 95 and 47, 33 and 52 for the subsamples ‘e.FX’, ‘small’ and ‘large’. 
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Table 3. Risk assessment of MFIFs 
   1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
Dependence on donations c.s. 18 (60.00) 3 (10.00) 5 (16.67) 3 (10.00) 1 (3.33) insign. (<0.0001) 
 e.FX 13 (65.00) 2 (10.00) 3 (15.00) 2 (10.00)   insign. (0.0002) 
Operational risks c.s. 3 (7.50) 11 (27.5) 12 (30.00) 12 (30.00) 2 (5.00) 
  e.FX 2 (6.67) 6 (20.00) 11 (36.67) 10 (33.33) 1 (3.33) 
Counterparty risk c.s. 4 (9.09) 7 (15.91) 8 (18.18) 11 (25) 14 (31.82) sign. (0.0057) 
  e.FX 1 (3.33) 3 (10.00) 6 (20.00) 7 (23.33) 13 (43.33) sign. (0.0003) 
Liquidity risk c.s. 9 (20.93) 11 (25.58) 9 (20.93) 13 (30.23) 1 (2.33) insign. (0.0299) 
  e.FX 3 (10.00) 10 (33.33) 8 (26.67) 9 (30.00)   
FX risk c.s. 7 (17.95) 8 (20.51) 8 (20.51) 10 (25.64) 6 (15.38) 
  e.FX 4 (13.79) 6 (20.69) 7 (24.14) 8 (27.59) 4 (13.79) 
Interest rate risk c.s. 5 (12.20) 10 (24.39) 14 (34.15) 10 (24.39) 2 (4.88) 
  e.FX 3 (10.71) 6 (21.43) 12 (42.86) 6 (21.43) 1 (3.57) 
Political instability c.s. 5 (11.63) 2 (4.65) 10 (23.26) 15 (34.88) 11 (25.58) sign. (0.0066) 
  e.FX 1 (3.33)   6 (20.00) 14 (46.67) 9 (30.00) sign. (<0.0001) 
Macroeconomic factors c.s. 1 (2.22) 7 (15.56) 16 (35.56) 14 (31.11) 7 (15.56) sign. (0.0046) 
  e.FX   4 (12.90) 9 (29.03) 12 (38.71) 6 (19.35) sign. (0.0009) 
Climatic risk factors c.s. 5 (11.36) 13 (29.55) 15 (34.09) 10 (22.73) 1 (2.27) insign. (0.0520) 
  e.FX 3 (9.68) 8 (25.81) 11 (35.48) 8 (25.81) 1 (3.23) 
Competition c.s. 5 (11.90) 9 (21.43) 14 (33.33) 9 (21.43) 5 (11.90) 
  e.FX 3 (10.00) 5 (16.67) 12 (40.00) 7 (23.33) 3 (10.00) 
Description: Survey question: “How would you rate the following potential types of risk for your organization?” Frequency tables with 
relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 (category 5) means that risk type is regarded as insignificant (very significant). The last 
column shows the results of one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with the neutral category 3 as null hypothesis, whenever the test rejects at 
a significance level of 10% (p-value in parentheses). No entry corresponds to a non-significant test result. ‘sign.’ or ‘insign.’ means that the 
risk types are regarded as rather ‘significant’ or ‘insignificant’. For a description of ‘c.s.’ and ‘e.FX’ see Table 1. ‘Counterparty risk’ refers to 
the credit risk arising from lending to MFIs. ‘Political instability’ could occur in the country in which the MFI operates. For a description of 
‘Macroeconomic factors’ and ‘Climatic risk factors’ see Table 2. ‘Competition’ occurs between the MFIF and other investors funding 
microfinance. The size of the entire sample is 69 and 32 for the subsample ‘e.FX’. 
 
3.2 What Can Be Stated about Lending Currencies? 
Table 4 shows in which currencies liabilities of MFIs are denominated, while Table 5 displays the currency 
structure for loans to MFIs granted by MFIFs. The large portion of MFIs that receive funds in local currencies is 
remarkable. In fact, for 24 MFIs, i.e. 38.71% of the sample, a share of 76% to 100% of the liabilities is 
denominated in the local currency. This result is surprising and in stark contrast to the literature. We explore this 
issue in further detail for those 50 MFIs of our sample, which reported their size of the loan portfolio and the 
country they mainly operate in. We hypothesize that there could be a positive link between the development 
status of a country’s financial system and the portion of the local currency the MFI’s funding corresponds to. The 
first notion is proxied by the size of domestic credit provided by the banking sector as percentage of GDP which 
we obtained via The World Bank (see data.worldbank.org). The results of an OLS regression based on the data of 
2009, in which we control for size effects, indicate that the portion of the local currency in MFI funding is 
indeed larger in countries with a more sophisticated financial system. 
On the other hand, only two (4.88%) MFIFs report upon not having granted loans in local currencies. Despite the 
increasing meaning of local currency, the results show that hard currencies still play an important role, especially 
USD and EUR, whereas GBP and CHF appear to play a secondary role. 
 
Table 4. Survey question: “In what currency does your organization receive funds (e.g. equity, loans,...) from 
investors?” 
  0% 01% – 25% 26% – 50% 51% – 75% 76% – 100% 
EUR 9 (34.62) 8 (30.77) 2 (7.69) 4 (15.38) 3 (11.54) 
USD 5 (10.20) 9 (18.37) 7 (14.29) 12 (24.49) 16 (32.65) 
CHF 9 (90.00) 1 (10.00) 
GBP 9 (90.00) 1 (10.00) 
LC 2 (3.23) 17 (27.42) 12 (19.35) 7 (11.29) 24 (38.71) 
Description: Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. The following categories are distinguished between: EUR, 
USD, CHF, GBB and local currency (LC). The sample size is 95. 
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Table 5. Survey question: “In what currency do you provide funds for MFIs?” 
  0% 01% – 25% 26% – 50% 51% – 75% 76% – 100% 
EUR 3 (13.64) 11 (50.00) 2 (9.09) 2 (9.09) 4 (18.18) 
USD 1 (3.45) 9 (31.03) 4 (13.79) 7 (24.14) 8 (27.59) 
CHF 13 (100.00) 
GBP 15 (100.00) 
LC 2 (4.88) 16 (39.02) 4 (9.76) 1 (2.44) 18 (43.90) 
Description: Question was addressed to MFIFs. Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. The following categories are 
distinguished between: EUR, USD, CHF, GBB and local currency (LC). The sample size is 69. 
 
3.3 Which Strategies and Instruments Are Used to Manage FX Risk? 
On the MFI level we differentiate between pure FX mitigation strategies, displayed in Table 6, and hedging 
instruments, shown in Table 8. The latter are based on international capital markets and implemented in 
cooperation with a financial intermediary. Generally, these instruments are also available for MFIFs. In contrast, 
mitigation strategies are measures employed to cope with FX risk on the MFI level, that also include relatively 
simple techniques such as setting limits to FX exposure or transferring the FX risk either to the microborrowers 
through indexation to hard currency or to the MFIFs by using currency devaluation accounts. Contrary to the 
prevailing opinion in the literature, all hedging instruments mentioned in the questionnaire are extremely rarely 
used except for back-to-back loans, which are employed by a few MFIs. 
The Wilcoxon signed rank tests indicate that nearly all FX mitigation strategies (Table 6) and hedging tools 
(Table 8) are applied rather seldomly. However, when comparing the figures of both tables the last ones appear 
to be used still more frequently. A comparison of small versus large MFIs via the Mann-Whitney U test shows 
that small MFIs draw on the indexation of microloans to hard currency more often than large MFIs. 
According to the results shown in Table 7, MFIFs use hedging instruments rather seldomly, with the exception of 
cross currency swaps. However, they appear to employ such instruments more often than MFIs, particularly 
cross currency swaps and futures. Unfortunately, this is not backed by the Mann-Whitney U tests, which only 
allow the conclusion that MFIs apply options more often than MFIFs. 
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Table 6. Usage of FX mitigation strategies by MFIs 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
Limits c.s. 6 (13.04) 12 (26.09) 3 (6.52) 7 (15.22) 6 (13.04) 12 (26.09) seld. (0.0720) 
e.FX 4 (11.76) 9 (26.47) 3 (8.82) 7 (20.59) 4 (11.76) 7 (20.59) seld. (0.0570) 
large 5 (15.62) 7 (21.88) 2 (6.25) 3 (9.38) 5 (15.62) 10 (31.25) 
  small 1 (7.14) 5 (35.71) 1 (7.14) 4 (28.57) 1 (7.14) 2 (14.29) seld. (0.0764) 
Indexation to HC c.s. 21 (44.68) 12 (25.53) 5 (10.64) 5 (10.64) 1 (2.13) 3 (6.38) seld. (<0.0001) 
e.FX 13 (37.14) 10 (28.57) 4 (11.43) 5 (14.29) 1 (2.86) 2 (5.71) seld. (<0.0001) 
large 17 (51.52) 8 (24.24) 2 (6.06) 4 (12.12) 2 (6.06) seld. (<0.0001) 
  small 4 (28.57) 4 (28.57) 3 (21.43) 1 (7.14) 1 (7.14) 1 (7.14) seld. (0.0060) 
Debt issuance in LC c.s. 17 (37.78) 7 (15.56) 2 (4.44) 5 (11.11) 3 (6.67) 11 (24.44) seld. (0.0004) 
e.FX 14 (42.42) 4 (12.12) 2 (6.06) 3 (9.09) 3 (9.09) 7 (21.21) seld. (0.0011) 
large 12 (37.5) 6 (18.75) 1 (3.12) 3 (9.38) 2 (6.25) 8 (25.00) seld. (0.0022) 
  small 5 (38.46) 1 (7.69) 1 (7.69) 2 (15.38) 1 (7.69) 3 (23.08) seld. (0.0570) 
Refinancing with loans  c.s. 7 (15.22) 6 (13.04) 8 (17.39) 9 (19.57) 6 (13.04) 10 (21.74) 
from banks in LC e.FX 7 (20.59) 4 (11.76) 7 (20.59) 6 (17.65) 4 (11.76) 6 (17.65) seld. (0.0331) 
large 2 (6.25) 5 (15.62) 4 (12.5) 7 (21.88) 5 (15.62) 9 (28.12) 
  small 5 (35.71) 1 (7.14) 4 (28.57) 2 (14.29) 1 (7.14) 1 (7.14) seld. (0.0104) 
Foreign currency  c.s. 14 (31.11) 10 (22.22) 9 (20) 4 (8.89) 1 (2.22) 7 (15.56) seld. (<0.0001) 
deposits,  e.FX 12 (36.36) 7 (21.21) 7 (21.21) 2 (6.06) 1 (3.03) 4 (12.12) seld. (0.0001) 
Countervailing large 8 (25.81) 5 (16.13) 7 (22.58) 4 (12.9) 1 (3.23) 6 (19.35) seld. (0.0074) 
FX deposits small 6 (42.86) 5 (35.71) 2 (14.29)     1 (7.14) seld. (0.0015) 
Currency devaluation  c.s. 23 (52.27) 10 (22.73) 5 (11.36) 2 (4.55) 2 (4.55) 2 (4.55) seld. (<0.0001) 
accounts e.FX 17 (51.52) 7 (21.21) 4 (12.12) 2 (6.06) 1 (3.03) 2 (6.06) seld. (<0.0001) 
large 16 (51.61) 7 (22.58) 2 (6.45) 2 (6.45) 2 (6.45) 2 (6.45) seld. (<0.0001) 
  small 7 (53.85) 3 (23.08) 3 (23.08)       seld. (0.0007) 
Description: Survey question: “Indicate what instruments or strategies other than hedging your organization uses to reduce your foreign 
exchange risk”. Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 (category 5) means that the strategy or 
instrument is rarely (often) used. Category 0 corresponds to no usage at all. The last column shows the results of one-sided Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests with the neutral category 3 (frequently used) as null hypothesis, whenever the test rejects at a significance level of 10% (p-value in 
parentheses). No entry corresponds to a non-significant test result. ‘seld.’ means that the strategy is used rather seldomly. For a description of 
‘c.s.’, ‘e.FX’, ‘large’ and ‘small’ see Tables 1 and 2. ‘Limits’ refers to the limitation of funds received in hard currency (HC), ‘indexation to 
HC’ means that a devaluation of the local currency (LC) leads to higher interest payments on the microloans. The size of the entire sample 
corresponds to 95 and 47, 33 and 52 for the subsamples ’e.FX’, ‘small’ and ‘large’. 
 
Table 7. Usage of FX hedging instruments by MFIFs 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
FX trade desk c.s. 7 (41.18) 2 (11.76) 1 (5.88) 7 (41.18) seld. (0.0416) 
  e.FX 6 (42.86) 2 (14.29)   1 (7.14)   5 (35.71) seld. (0.0361) 
OTC: currency swaps c.s. 10 (66.67) 1 (6.67) 4 (26.67) seld. (0.0029) 
  e.FX 9 (69.23)     1 (7.69)   3 (23.08) seld. (0.0037) 
OTC: currency forwards c.s. 5 (25.00) 3 (15.00) 1 (5.00) 4 (20.00) 1 (5.00) 6 (30.00) 
 e.FX 5 (26.32) 3 (15.79) 1 (5.26) 4 (21.05) 1 (5.26) 5 (26.32) seld. (0.0694) 
OTC: currency futures c.s. 14 (87.50) 2 (12.50) seld. (<0.0001) 
  e.FX 13 (86.67) 2 (13.33)         seld. (0.0001) 
OTC: currency options c.s. 14 (82.35) 3 (17.65) seld. (<0.0001) 
  e.FX 13 (81.25) 3 (18.75)         seld. (<0.0001) 
OTC: cross currency swaps c.s. 7 (31.82) 1 (4.55) 2 (9.09) 3 (13.64) 9 (40.91) 
 e.FX 6 (30.00)   1 (5.00) 2 (10.00) 3 (15.00) 8 (40.00) 
Back-to-back loans c.s. 7 (41.18) 3 (17.65) 3 (17.65) 3 (17.65) 1 (5.88) seld. (0.0015) 
  e.FX 6 (37.5) 3 (18.75) 3 (18.75) 3 (18.75)   1 (6.25) seld. (0.0025) 
Description: Survey question: “When lending to MFIs in a currency other than a hard currency, indicate what instruments or strategies you 
use to hedge your loan portfolio against foreign exchange risk.” Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 
(category 5) means that the strategy or instrument is rarely (often) used. Category 0 corresponds to no usage at all. The last column shows the 
results of one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests regarding neutral category 3 (frequently used) as null hypothesis, whenever the test rejects at 
a significance level of 10% (p-value in parentheses). No entry corresponds to a non-significant test result. ‘seld.’ means that the strategy is 
used rather seldomly. For a description of ‘c.s.’ and ‘e.FX’ see Table 1. ‘FX trade desk’ refers to the cooperation with an international bank. 
‘OTC’ indicates that the instrument is traded ‘over the counter’. The size of the entire sample is 69 and 32 for the subsample ‘e.FX’. 
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Table 8. Usage of FX hedging instruments by MFIs 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
FX trade desk c.s. 5 (50.00) 3 (30.00) 2 (20.00) seld. (0.0026) 
e.FX 4 (50.00) 2 (25.00) 2 (25.00) seld. (0.0064) 
large 5 (62.50) 1 (12.50) 2 (25.00) seld. (0.0059) 
  small   2 (100.00)         
OTC: currency swaps c.s. 6 (60.00) 2 (20.00) 1 (10.00) 1 (10.00) seld. (0.0071) 
e.FX 5 (62.50) 1 (12.50) 1 (12.50) 1 (12.50) seld. (0.0175) 
large 6 (85.71) 1 (14.29) seld. (0.0119) 
  small   2 (66.67)   1 (33.33)     
OTC: currency forwards c.s. 4 (40.00) 3 (30.00) 1 (10.00) 1 (10.00) 1 (10.00) seld. (0.0402) 
e.FX 3 (37.50) 2 (25.00) 1 (12.50) 1 (12.50) 1 (12.50) seld. (0.0992) 
large 4 (57.14) 1 (14.29) 1 (14.29) 1 (14.29) seld. (0.0603) 
  small     2 (66.67) 1 (33.33)     
OTC: currency futures c.s. 7 (77.78) 1 (11.11) 1 (11.11) seld. (0.0030) 
e.FX 6 (85.71) 1 (14.29) seld. (0.0074) 
large 7 (100.00) seld. (0.0054) 
  small   1 (50.00) 1 (50.00)       
OTC: currency options c.s. 7 (63.64) 1 (9.09) 2 (18.18) 1 (9.09) seld. (0.0052) 
e.FX 6 (85.71) 1 (14.29) seld. (0.0074) 
large 7 (77.78) 1 (11.11) 1 (11.11) seld. (0.0064) 
  small   1 (50.00)   1 (50.00)     
OTC: cross currency  c.s. 5 (55.56) 2 (22.22) 2 (22.22) seld. (0.0039) 
swaps e.FX 4 (57.14) 2 (28.57) 1 (14.29) seld. (0.0010) 
large 5 (71.43) 1 (14.29) 1 (14.29) seld. (0.0089) 
  small   1 (50.00) 1 (50.00)       
Back-to-back loans c.s. 13 (29.55) 8 (18.18) 10 (22.73) 8 (18.18) 2 (4.55) 3 (6.82) seld. (<0.0001) 
e.FX 8 (25.00) 5 (15.62) 7 (21.88) 7 (21.88) 2 (6.25) 3 (9.38) seld. (0.0012) 
large 8 (25.00) 6 (18.75) 7 (21.88) 6 (18.75) 2 (6.25) 3 (9.38) seld. (0.0008) 
  small 5 (41.67) 2 (16.67) 3 (25.00) 2 (16.67)     seld. (0.0026) 
Description: Survey question: “If there is hedging in place for at least a portion of the portfolio, which of the following hedging strategies 
does your organization use to reduce foreign exchange risk?” Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 
(category 5) means that the strategy or instrument is rarely (often) used. Category 0 corresponds to no usage at all. The last column shows the 
results of one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with the neutral category 3 (frequently used) as null hypothesis, whenever the test rejects at a 
significance level of 10% (p-value in parentheses). No entry corresponds to a non-significant test result. ‘seld.’ means that the strategy is used 
rather seldomly. For a description of ‘c.s.’, ‘e.FX’, ‘large’ and ‘small’ see Tables 1 and 2. For a description of ‘FX trade desk’ and ‘OTC’ see 
Table 7. The size of the entire sample is 95 and 47, 33 and 52 for the subsamples ‘e.FX’, ‘small’ and ‘large’. 
 
3.4 Why Does Some FX Risk Exposure Remain Unhedged? 
So far we have found evidence to prove that microfinance actors, particularly MFIs, are deterred from using the 
hedging instruments often described in the literature. The results presented in Table 9 indicate that MFIs and 
MFIFs do not use unmentioned alternatives either but rather leave parts of their FX exposure unhedged. In fact, 
none of the participating MFIs is hedged completely against FX risk. Even 65.71% of the MFIs belonging to the 
‘e.FX’ sample do not hedge their FX exposure at all, whereas large MFIs tend to hedge a larger part. MFIFs 
manifest a slightly better hedging behavior, as 65% of the MFIFs exposed to FX risk hedge at least 21% of their 
FX exposure and only 18.75% abstain from hedging at least a part of their portfolio. 
Possible reasons why MFIFs and MFIs neglect a portion of their FX risk are presented in Table 10 and Table 11, 
respectively. For MFIs, the high transaction costs are the only statistically significant reason. Note that MFIs are 
in fact well aware of FX risk, as shown by a share of 85.18% answering that ‘no awareness of FX risk’ is not the 
reason for the decision not to hedge. Similarly, the reasons ‘bureaucracy’, ‘inefficiencies’ and ‘company policies’ 
are also regarded as being insignificant. MFIs do not appear to be willing to accept FX risk for higher expected 
returns either. MFIFs regard the lack of adequate hedging tools to be the most important reason. Indeed, MFIFs 
generally seem to have relatively similar reasons for why they neglect FX risk. This is also confirmed by the fact 
that the Mann-Whitney U tests show no significant differences regarding the perception of the various reasons. 
Neglecting FX risk in general seems to be caused by the lack of adequate hedging tools due to thin financial 
markets. 
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Table 9. Share of FX exposure hedged by MFIs and MFIFs 
  MFI (c.s.) MFI 
(e.FX) 
MFI 
(large) 
MFI 
(small) 
MFIF 
(c.s.) 
MFIF 
(e.FX) 
0% 32 (66.67) 23 (65.71) 21 (63.64) 10 (71.43) 14 (31.11) 6 (18.75) 
1% – 10% 3 (6.67) 2 (6.25) 
11% – 20% 5 (11.11) 4 (12.5) 
21% – 30% 1 (2.08) 1 (2.86) 1 (3.03) 17 (37.78) 14 (43.75) 
31% – 40% 3 (6.25) 2 (5.71) 2 (6.06) 1 (7.14) 1 (2.22) 1 (3.12) 
41% – 50% 6 (12.5) 5 (14.29) 5 (15.15) 1 (7.14) 1 (2.22) 1 (3.12) 
51% – 60% 2 (4.44) 2 (6.25) 
61% – 70% 3 (6.25) 1 (2.86) 2 (6.06) 1 (7.14) 1 (2.22) 1 (3.12) 
71% – 80% 
81% – 90% 3 (6.25) 3 (8.57) 2 (6.06) 1 (7.14) 
91% – 99% 1 (2.22) 1 (3.12) 
100%             
Description: Survey question MFIs: “If the funding currency of your loan portfolio differs from the operating currency, what percentage of 
funds received is hedged against foreign exchange rate fluctuations?” and survey question MFIFs: “Indicate what percentage of your 
organization’s loan portfolio lent to MFIs in local currencies is hedged against foreign exchange rate fluctuations.” Frequency tables with 
relative percentage values in parentheses. For a description of ‘c.s.’, ‘e.FX’, ‘large’ and ‘small’ see Tables 1 and 2. The size of the entire 
sample is 95 for MFIs and 69 for MFIFs, 47 and 32 for the MFI and MFIF ‘e.FX’ subsamples, 33 and 52 for the subsamples ‘small’ and 
‘large’. 
 
Table 10. Reasons why MFIFs neglect FX risk mitigation 
    1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
No adequate tools c.s. 4 (17.39) 1 (4.35) 5 (21.74) 1 (4.35) 12 (52.17) sign. (0.0242) 
  e.FX 2 (10.53) 1 (5.26) 4 (21.05) 1 (5.26) 11 (57.89) sign. (0.0070) 
High transaction costs c.s. 5 (21.74) 3 (13.04) 6 (26.09) 3 (13.04) 6 (26.09) 
  e.FX 4 (22.22) 2 (11.11) 5 (27.78) 3 (16.67) 4 (22.22) 
Regulatory obstacles c.s. 7 (35.00) 4 (20.00) 6 (30.00) 1 (5.00) 2 (10.00) insign. (0.0296) 
  e.FX 5 (31.25) 4 (25.00) 5 (31.25) 1 (6.25) 1 (6.25) insign. (0.0274) 
Bureaucracy c.s. 10 (52.63) 7 (36.84) 1 (5.26) 1 (5.26) insign. (0.0002) 
  e.FX 8 (50.00) 7 (43.75) 1 (6.25)     insign. (0.0003) 
Inefficiencies c.s. 8 (40.00) 5 (25.00) 4 (20.00) 1 (5.00) 2 (10.00) insign. (0.0141) 
  e.FX 6 (37.5) 5 (31.25) 4 (25.00)   1 (6.25) insign. (0.0086) 
Acceptance of higher risk c.s. 7 (36.84) 4 (21.05) 2 (10.53) 4 (21.05) 2 (10.53) insign. (0.0594) 
 e.FX 7 (50.00) 2 (14.29) 2 (14.29) 2 (14.29) 1 (7.14) insign. (0.0209) 
Company policies c.s. 8 (50.00) 2 (12.50) 1 (6.25) 3 (18.75) 2 (12.50) insign. (0.0408) 
  e.FX 6 (46.15) 1 (7.69) 1 (7.69) 3 (23.08) 2 (15.38) 
Description: Survey question: “Which of the following issues do you consider a significant reason why part of your organization’s loan 
portfolio might not be hedged against foreign exchange risk?” Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 
(category 5) means that the issue is regarded as being insignificant (very significant). The last column shows the results of one-sided 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests with the neutral category 3 (significant reason) as null hypothesis, whenever the test rejects at a significance level 
of 10% (p-value in parentheses). No entry corresponds to a non-significant test result. ‘sign.’ or ‘insign.’ means that the issues are regarded as 
rather ’significant’ or ’insignificant’. For a description of ‘c.s.’, and ‘e.FX’ see Table 1. ‘No adequate tools’ could possibly be due to 
imperfections of financial markets in developing countries. ‘High transaction costs’ arise due to relatively small loan sizes. ‘Regulatory 
obstacles’ might prevent the installation of the required capacities (e.g. legal issues, money transfer limitations). ’Inefficiencies’ are e.g. a 
large delay when setting up hedging facilities. The ‘acceptance of higher risk’ may be due to expected higher returns. ‘Company policies’ 
might allow a higher level of risk. The size of the whole sample is 69 and 32 for the subsample ‘e.FX’. 
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Table 11. Reasons why MFIs neglect FX risk mitigation 
    1 2 3 4 5 Wilcoxon test 
Not aware of FX risk c.s. 12 (44.44) 11 (40.74) 3 (11.11) 1 (3.70) insign. (<0.0001) 
e.FX 8 (42.11) 7 (36.84) 3 (15.79) 1 (5.26) insign. (0.0004) 
large 9 (64.29) 3 (21.43) 2 (14.29) insign. (0.0008) 
  small 3 (23.08) 8 (61.54) 1 (7.69) 1 (7.69)   insign. (0.0029) 
No adequate tools c.s. 6 (16.22) 7 (18.92) 9 (24.32) 7 (18.92) 8 (21.62) 
e.FX 5 (17.86) 5 (17.86) 7 (25) 5 (17.86) 6 (21.43) 
large 5 (25.00) 1 (5.00) 5 (25.00) 3 (15.00) 6 (30.00) 
  small 1 (5.88) 6 (35.29) 4 (23.53) 4 (23.53) 2 (11.76)   
High transaction costs c.s. 2 (5.26) 4 (10.53) 18 (47.37) 6 (15.79) 8 (21.05) sign. (0.0238) 
e.FX 1 (3.45) 2 (6.9) 16 (55.17) 5 (17.24) 5 (17.24) sign. (0.0283) 
large 2 (11.11) 2 (11.11) 7 (38.89) 3 (16.67) 4 (22.22) 
  small   2 (10.00) 11 (55.00) 3 (15.00) 4 (20.00) sign. (0.0257) 
Regulatory obstacles c.s. 9 (27.27) 7 (21.21) 9 (27.27) 8 (24.24) 
e.FX 6 (25.00) 4 (16.67) 8 (33.33) 6 (25.00) 
large 6 (31.58) 4 (21.05) 3 (15.79) 6 (31.58) 
  small 3 (21.43) 3 (21.43) 6 (42.86)   2 (14.29)   
Bureaucracy c.s. 13 (43.33) 9 (30.00) 3 (10.00) 5 (16.67) insign. (0.0081) 
e.FX 10 (45.45) 6 (27.27) 3 (13.64) 3 (13.64) insign. (0.0099) 
large 9 (56.25) 4 (25.00) 1 (6.25) 2 (12.50) insign. (0.0093) 
  small 4 (28.57) 5 (35.71) 2 (14.29)   3 (21.43)   
Inefficiencies c.s. 17 (54.84) 7 (22.58) 3 (9.68) 3 (9.68) 1 (3.23) insign. (<0.0001) 
e.FX 13 (59.09) 3 (13.64) 3 (13.64) 2 (9.09) 1 (4.55) insign. (0.0007) 
large 11 (73.33) 3 (20.00) 1 (6.67) insign. (0.0013) 
  small 6 (37.50) 4 (25.00) 3 (18.75) 3 (18.75)   insign. (0.0088) 
Acceptance of higher risk c.s. 14 (48.28) 2 (6.90) 9 (31.03) 4 (13.79) insign. (0.0002) 
e.FX 11 (50.00) 1 (4.55) 8 (36.36) 2 (9.09) insign. (0.0007) 
large 10 (66.67) 4 (26.67) 1 (6.67) insign. (0.0011) 
  small 4 (28.57) 2 (14.29) 5 (35.71) 3 (21.43)   insign. (0.0568) 
Company policies c.s. 12 (38.71) 8 (25.81) 7 (22.58) 3 (9.68) 1 (3.23) insign. (0.0004) 
e.FX 8 (33.33) 7 (29.17) 7 (29.17) 2 (8.33) insign. (0.0007) 
large 10 (58.82) 3 (17.65) 3 (17.65) 1 (5.88) insign. (0.0006) 
  small 2 (14.29) 5 (35.71) 4 (28.57) 2 (14.29) 1 (7.14)   
Description: Survey question: “If a part of your foreign exchange risk exposure remains unhedged, indicate how significant the following 
issues are for this situation.” Frequency tables with relative percentage values in parentheses. Category 1 (category 5) means that the issue is 
regarded as being insignificant (very significant). The last column shows the results of one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests with the neutral 
category 3 as null hypothesis, whenever the test rejects at a significance level of 10% (p-value in parentheses). No entry corresponds to a 
non-significant test result. ‘sign.’ or ‘insign.’ means that the issue is regarded as rather ‘significant’ or ‘insignificant’. For a description of 
‘c.s.’, ‘e.FX’, ‘large’ and ‘small’ see Tables 1 and 2. For a description of the possible reasons see Table 10. The size of the whole sample is 95 
and 47, 33 and 52 for the subsamples ‘e.FX’, ‘small’ and ‘large’. 
 
4. Conclusion  
We conclude that MFIs and MFIFs consider several risk types, among them FX risk, not to be as important as is 
commonly reported upon in the literature. Furthermore, we reveal that many FX risk management tools, 
recommended in the respective literature, are somewhat rarely used in practice. The reason for this phenomenon 
can be seen in the lack of suitable, cost effective hedging tools that remain unavailable for many MFIs and 
MFIFs. This paper contributes to closing the gap in existing literature on the question regarding how the 
microfinance sector assesses different risk types, especially FX risk. 
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